Some of the applications of OWL and RDF (e.g. biomedical knowledge representation and semantic policy formulation) call for extensions of these languages with nonmonotonic constructs such as inheritance with overriding. Nonmonotonic description logics have been studied for many years, however no practical such knowledge representation languages exist, due to a combination of semantic difficulties and high computational complexity. Independently, low-complexity description logics such as DL-lite and EL have been introduced and incorporated in the OWL standard. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether the syntactic restrictions characterizing DL-lite and EL bring computational benefits to their nonmonotonic versions, too. In this paper we extensively investigate the computational complexity of Circumscription when knowledge bases are formulated in DL-lite R , EL, and fragments thereof. We identify fragments whose complexity ranges from P to the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, as well as fragments whose complexity raises to PSPACE and beyond.
Introduction
The ontologies at the core of the semantic web -as well as ontology languages such as RDF, OWL, and related Description Logics (DLs) -are founded on fragments of first-order logic and inherit strengths and weaknesses of this well-established formalism. Limitations include monotonicity, and the consequent inability to design knowledge bases (KBs) by describing prototypes whose general properties can be later refined with suitable exceptions. This natural, iterative approach is commonly used by biologists and calls for an extension of DLs with defeasible inheritance with overriding (a mechanism normally supported by object-oriented languages). Some workarounds have been devised for particular cases; however, no general solutions are currently available (Rector, 2004; Stevens, Aranguren, Wolstencroft, Sattler, Drummond, Horridge, & Rector, 2007) . Another motivation for nonmonotonic DLs stems from the recent development of policy languages based on DLs (Uszok, Bradshaw, Jeffers, Suri, Hayes, Breedy, Bunch, Johnson, Kulkarni, & Lott, 2003; Finin, Joshi, Kagal, Niu, Sandhu, Winsborough, & Thuraisingham, 2008; Zhang, Artale, Giunchiglia, & Crispo, 2009; Kolovski, Hendler, & Parsia, 2007) . DLs nicely capture role-based policies and facilitate the integration of semantic web policy enforcement with reasoning about semantic metadata (which is typically necessary in order to check policy conditions). However, in order to formulate standard default policies such as open and closed policies, 1 and support common policy language features such as authorization inheritance with exceptions (which is meant to facilitate incremental 1. If no explicit authorization has been specified for a given access request, then an open policy permits the access while a closed policy denies it.
policy formulation), it is necessary to adopt a nonmonotonic semantics; Bonatti and Samarati (2003) provide further details on the matter. Given the increasing size of semantic web ontologies and RDF bases, the complexity of reasoning is an influential factor that may either foster or prevent the adoption of a knowledge representation language. Accordingly, OWL2 introduces profiles that adopt syntactic restrictions (compatible with application requirements) in order to make reasoning tractable. Two of such profiles are based on the following families of DLs: DL-lite (Calvanese, De Giacomo, Lembo, Lenzerini, & Rosati, 2005) , that formalizes RDFS, and EL (Baader, 2003; Baader, Brandt, & Lutz, 2005) , that extensively covers important biomedical ontologies such as GALEN and SNOMED. Unfortunately, in general, nonmonotonic DL reasoning can be highly complex and reach NExpTime NP and even 3-ExpTime (Donini, Nardi, & Rosati, 1997 , 2002 Bonatti, Lutz, & Wolter, 2009) . A natural question, in this context, is whether restrictions such as those adopted by DL-lite and EL help in reducing the complexity of nonmonotonic DL reasoning, too.
Answering this question is the main goal of this paper. We extensively investigate the complexity of reasoning in DL-lite and EL. The nonmonotonic semantics adopted is Circumscription (McCarthy, 1980) , whose main appealing properties (discriminating Circumscription from other nonmonotonic DL semantics proposed in the literature) are summarized below:
Circumscription is compatible with all the interpretation domains supported by classical DLs;
there is no need for adopting a fixed domain of standard names;
2. In circumscribed DLs, nonmonotonic inferences apply to all individuals, including those that are not denoted by any constants and are implicitly asserted by existential quantifiers;
3. Circumscription naturally supports priorities among conflicting nonmonotonic axioms and can easily simulate specificity-based overriding.
As an attempt to simplify the usage of circumscribed DLs and simultaneously remove potential sources of computational complexity, we do not support the usage of abnormality predicates (McCarthy, 1986) in their full generality; we rather hide them within defeasible inclusions (Bonatti, Faella, & Sauro, 2009) . Defeasible inclusions are expressions C n D whose intuitive meaning is: an instance of C is normally an instance of D. Such inclusions can be prioritized to resolve conflicts. Priorities can be either explicit or automatically determined by the inclusion's specificity, i.e. a defeasible inclusion C 1 n D 1 may override C 2 n D 2 if C 1 is classically subsumed by C 2 . In this framework, we prove that restricting the syntax to DL-lite inclusions suffices-in almost all cases-to reduce complexity to the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. On the contrary, circumscribed EL is still ExpTime-hard and further restrictions are needed to confine complexity within the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. Syntactic restrictions will be analyzed in conjunction with other semantic parameters, such as the kind of priorities adopted (explicit or specificity-based), and which predicates may or may not be affected by Circumscription (i.e., fixed and variable predicates, in Circumscription's jargon). The paper is organized as follows: First, the basics of low-complexity description logics and their extension based on circumscription are recalled in Section 2 and Section 3, respectively. Then, some reductions that can be used to eliminate language features and work on simpler frameworks are illustrated in Section 4. After an undecidability result caused by fixed roles (Section 5), the paper focuses on variable roles: The complexity of circumscribed DL-lite R and EL/EL ⊥ are investigated in Section 6 and Section 7, respectively. A section on related work and a final discussion conclude the paper.
Preliminaries
In DLs, concepts are inductively defined with a set of constructors, starting with a set N C of concept names, a set N R of role names, and (possibly) a set N I of individual names (all countably infinite). We use the term predicates to refer to elements of N C ∪ N R . Hereafter, letters A and B will range over N C , P will range over N R , and a, b, c will range over N I . The concepts of the DLs dealt with in this paper are formed using the constructors shown in Figure 1 . There, the inverse role constructor is the only role constructor, whereas the remaining constructors are concept constructors. Letters C, D will range over concepts and letters R, S over (possibly inverse) roles. The semantics of the above concepts is defined in terms of interpretations I = (∆ I , · I ). The domain ∆ I is a non-empty set of individuals and the interpretation function · I maps each concept name A ∈ N C to a set A I ⊆ ∆ I , each role name P ∈ N R to a binary relation P I on ∆ I , and each individual name a ∈ N I to an individual a I ∈ ∆ I . The extension of · I to inverse roles and arbitrary concepts is inductively defined as shown in the third column of Figure 1 . An interpretation I is called a model of a concept C if C I = ∅. If I is a model of C, we also say that C is satisfied by I.
A (strong) knowledge base is a finite set of (i) concept inclusions (CIs) C D where C and D are concepts, (ii) concept assertions A(a) and role assertions P (a, b), where a, b are individual names, P ∈ N R , and A ∈ N C , (iii) role inclusions (RIs) R R . An interpretation I satisfies (i) a CI C D if C I ⊆ D I , (ii) an assertion C(a) if a I ∈ C I , (iii) an assertion P (a, b) if (a I , b I ) ∈ P I , and (iv) a RI R R iff R I ⊆ R I . Then, I is a model of a strong knowledge base S iff I satisfies all the elements of S. We write C S D iff for all models I of S, I satisfies C D.
Terminologies are particular strong knowledge bases consisting of definitions, i.e. axioms such as A ≡ C, that abbreviate the inclusions A C and C A. If a terminology T contains the above definition, then we say that A is defined in T and that C is the definition of A. Each A defined in T must have a unique definition. A concept name A directly depends on B (in T ) if B occurs in A's definition; moreover, A depends on B (in T ) if there is a chain of such direct dependencies leading from A to B. A terminology T is acyclic if no A depends on itself in T . Terminologies are conservative extensions, and the concept names defined in an acyclic terminology T can be eliminated by unfolding them w.r.t. T , that is, by exhaustively replacing the concepts defined in T with their definition. For all expressions (i.e., concepts or inclusions) E, we denote with unf(E, T ) the unfolding of E w.r.t. T .
The logic DL-lite R (Calvanese et al., 2005) restricts concept inclusions to expressions C L C R , where C L ::= A | ∃R R ::= P | P − C R ::= C L | ¬C L (as usual, ∃R abbreviates ∃R. ). The logic EL (Baader, 2003; Baader et al., 2005) restricts knowledge bases to assertions and concept inclusions built from the following constructs:
C ::= A | | C 1 C 2 | ∃P.C (note that inverse roles are not supported). The extension of EL with ⊥, role hierarchies, and nominals (respectively) are denoted by EL ⊥ , ELH, and ELO. Combinations are allowed: for example ELHO denotes the extension of EL supporting role hierarchies and nominals. Finally, EL ¬A denotes the extension where negation can be applied to concept names.
Defeasible Knowledge
A general defeasible inclusion (GDI) is an expression C n D whose intended meaning is: C's elements are normally in D.
Example 3.1 The sentences: "in humans, the heart is usually located on the left-hand side of the body; in humans with situs inversus, the heart is located on the right-hand side of the body" (Rector, 2004; Stevens et al., 2007) can be formalized with the EL ⊥ axioms and GDIs:
Human n ∃has heart.∃has position.Left ; Situs Inversus ∃has heart.∃has position.Right ; ∃has heart.∃has position.Left ∃has heart.∃has position.Right ⊥ . 2
A defeasible knowledge base (DKB) in a logic DL is a pair K, ≺ , where
and ≺ is a strict partial order (a priority relation) over K D . In the following, by C [n] D we denote an inclusion that is either classical or defeasible. Moreover, for a DKB KB = K ∪ T , ≺ , where T is a (classical) acyclic terminology, we denote by unf(KB) = K , ≺ the DKB where K is the unfolding of all inclusions in K w.r.t. T , and, for all DIs δ, δ in K, the relation unf(δ, T ) ≺ unf(δ , T ) holds if and only if δ ≺ δ .
As priority relation we shall often adopt the specificity relation ≺ K which is determined by classically valid inclusions. Formally, for all GDIs δ 1 = (C 1 n D 1 ) and δ 2 = (C 2 n D 2 ), let Staff members cannot simultaneously satisfy the two defeasible inclusions (due to the last inclusion above). With specificity, the second defeasible inclusion overrides the first one and yields the intuitive inference that non-blacklisted staff members are indeed allowed to access project files. More formally, the subsumption ∃subj.(Staff ¬Blacklisted) ∃target.Proj ∃op.Read ∃decision.{Grant} holds in all the models of the above knowledge base (as defined below).
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Intuitively, a model of K, ≺ is a model of K S that maximizes the set of individuals satisfying the defeasible inclusions in K D , resolving conflicts by means of the priority relation ≺ whenever possible. In formalizing the notion of model, one should specify how to deal with the predicates occurring in the knowledge base: is their extension allowed to vary in order to satisfy defeasible inclusions? A discussion of the effects of letting predicates vary vs. fixing their extension can be found in the work of Bonatti, Lutz and Wolter (2006) ; they conclude that the appropriate choice is application dependent. So, in general, the set of predicates N C ∪N R can be arbitrarily partitioned into two sets F and V containing fixed and varying predicates, respectively; we denote this semantics by Circ * F . However, in Section 5 it is shown that fixed roles cause undecidability issues, so most of our results concern a specialized framework in which all role names are varying predicates, that is, F ⊆ N C . We use the notation Circ F (rather than Circ * F ) to indicate that F ⊆ N C . The set F , the GDIs K D , and the priority relation ≺ induce a strict partial order over interpretations. As we move down the ordering we find interpretations that are more and more normal w.r.t. K D . For all δ = (C n D) and all interpretations I let the set of individuals satisfying δ be:
Definition 3.3 Let KB = K, ≺ be a DKB. For all interpretations I and J , and all F ⊆ N C ∪ N R , let I < KB,F J iff:
2. a I = a J , for all a ∈ N I ; 3. A I = A J , for all A ∈ F ∩ N C , and
The subscript KB will be omitted when clear from context. Now a model of a DKB can be defined as a maximally preferred model of its strong (i.e. classical) part.
Remark 3.5 This semantics is a special case of the circumscribed DLs introduced by Bonatti et al. (2006) . The correspondence can be seen by (i) introducing for each GDI C n D a fresh atomic concept Ab, playing the role of an abnormality predicate; (ii) replacing C n D with C ¬Ab D; (iii) minimizing all the predicates Ab introduced above.
In order to enhance readability, we will use the following notation for the special cases in which all concept names are varying and the case in which they are all fixed: < var and Circ var stand for < ∅ and Circ ∅ , respectively; < fix and Circ fix stand respectively for < N C and Circ N C . For a DKB KB = K S ∪ K D , ≺ , we say that an interpretation I is a classical model of KB in case I is a model of K S .
In this paper, we consider the following standard reasoning tasks over defeasible DLs:
Knowledge base consistency Given a DKB KB, decide whether Circ * F (KB) has a model.
Concept consistency
Given a concept C and a DKB KB, check whether C is satisfiable w.r.t. KB, that is, whether a model I of Circ * F (KB) exists such that C I = ∅.
Subsumption Given two concepts C, D and a DKB KB, check whether Circ * F (KB) |= C D, that is, whether for all models I of Circ *
Instance checking Given a ∈ N I , a concept C, and a DKB KB, check whether Circ * F (KB) |= C(a), that is, whether for all models I of Circ * F (KB), a I ∈ C I .
The following example illustrates most of the above tasks as well as the main difference between Circ var and Circ fix .
Example 3.6 Consider the following simplification of Example 3.2:
User n ¬∃decision.{Grant} Staff User Staff n ∃decision.{Grant} BlacklistedStaff Staff ¬∃decision.{Grant} .
Extend the knowledge base with the assertion Staff(John), and let the priority relation be ≺ K (i.e., priorities are determined by specificity). Denote the resulting knowledge base with KB. Due to the inclusion Staff User, the GDI for Staff (third line) has higher priority than the GDI for User (first line). Therefore, in all models I of Circ var (KB), John belongs to ∃decision.{Grant} and hence the following entailments hold:
Circ var (KB) |= {John} ∃decision.{Grant} (subsumption)
(1) Circ var (KB) |= ∃decision.{Grant}(John) (instance checking)
Interestingly, John does not belong to BlacklistedStaff, because this is the only way of satisfying the top-priority GDI for Staff. Analogously, in all models I of Circ var (KB), John is the only member of Staff because this setting maximizes the number of individuals satisfying both GDIs (as all the individuals in ¬Staff vacuously satisfy the GDI for Staff for all values of decision).
More generally, as a side effect of the maximization of all sat I (δ), Circ var induces a sort of closedworld assumption over all concepts with exceptional properties (w.r.t. some larger concept). Consequently, BlacklistedStaff is not satisfiable w.r.t. KB, and the following subsumption holds:
On the contrary, under Circ fix , User and Staff may contain any number of individuals (other than zero) because Circ fix is not allowed to change the extension of any atomic concept, even if this would satisfy more GDIs. Similarly, there exist models of Circ fix (KB) where John does not belong to ∃decision.{Grant} because John belongs to BlacklistedStaff and Circ fix does not allow to change its extension to satisfy more GDIs. As a consequence, it can be easily verified that BlacklistedStaff is satisfiable w.r.t. Circ fix (KB), and that (1), (2), and (3) do not hold if Circ var is replaced by Circ fix . We only have inferences such as:
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Note that in Circ var one can obtain nominals (cf. Staff in (3)) without using nominals explicitly in the knowledge base. If other axioms do not interfere, then an assertion A(a) and a GDI A n ⊥ suffice to make A a singleton. This idea will be used in some reductions later on. The next example deals with multiple inheritance, and in particular with parent concepts with conflicting properties. Circ fix (KB ) |= {Moby} ∃has organ.Lungs ∃has organ.Gills , (similarly, the aforementioned expected consequences are entailed by Circ fix (KB )). The conflict between the properties inherited from Mammal and SeaAnimal can be settled as discussed above.
The impossibility of forcing existentials with GDIs in Circ fix , illustrated by the above example, can be exploited to check whether a concept is always nonempty. It suffices to introduce a fresh role aux (in order to prevent interference with the other axioms of the knowledge base) and a GDI n ∃aux.C. Clearly, the subsumption ∃aux.C is entailed iff C is nonempty in all models of Circ fix (KB). Similar ideas will be used in the rest of the paper.
The next example is artificial. It is a convenient way of illustrating the interplay of specificity and multiple inheritance.
Example 3.8 Let KB be the following set of axioms:
For all sets of concept names F , and for all models I of Circ F (KB), each member x of B I (if any) satisfies exactly one of the top priority GDIs (12) and (13) 
The last two examples show that GDIs and disjointness constraints together can express disjoint unions. Similar techniques will be used later on to simulate the law of excluded middle, negation, and 3-valued logic. Subsumption, instance checking, and the complement of concept satisfiability can be reduced to each other, as in the classical setting:
Theorem 3.9 Let DL range over DL-lite R and EL ⊥ ; let X = var, fix, F . In Circ X (DL), subsumption, instance checking, and concept unsatisfiability can be reduced to each other in constant time.
The proof is not completely standard, due to the limited expressiveness of DL-lite R and EL ⊥ , as well as the peculiarities of nonmonotonic reasoning. 3
Proof. First we focus on Circ var and Circ F , where F consists of concept names occurring in a given KB.
From unsatisfiability to subsumption. Checking unsatisfiability of a concept C can be reduced to checking the subsumption C ⊥. DL-lite R does not support ⊥ explicitly, however an equivalent concept A ⊥ can be easily defined with the inclusion A ⊥ ¬A ⊥ .
From subsumption to unsatisfiability. Conversely, a subsumption C D can be reduced to the unsatisfiability of C ¬D. In DL-lite R conjunction is not supported, so the subsumption must be reduced to the unsatisfiability of a fresh variable concept A axiomatized by A C and A ¬D. In EL ⊥ conjunction is supported while negation is not; therefore the given subsumption can be reduced to the unsatisfiability of C D whereD is a fresh variable concept axiomatized withD D ⊥.
From instance checking to subsumption. An instance checking query C(a) can be reduced to subsumption as follows: Introduce a fresh variable concept A and assert A(a); then minimize A with A n ⊥; now in all models I of Circ var , A I = {a I }. It follows that C(a) holds iff the subsumption A C holds.
From unsatisfiability to instance checking. Finally, the unsatisfiability of a concept C is equivalent to the validity of the instance checking problem ¬C(a), where a is a fresh individual constant. In EL ⊥ , ¬C must be suitably axiomatized with a fresh concept nameC and the inclusions C C ⊥, n C, and nC (these three axioms entail the subsumption C C , thereby enforcing the law of the excluded middle). In order to preserve the semantics of the knowledge base, n C and nC must be given a priority strictly smaller than the priority of all the other defeasible inclusion in the KB. This ensures that the new GDIs cannot block the application of any of the original GDIs. Clearly, the two new GDIs must have the same priority.
3. For example, in classical logic a subsumption C D is a logical consequence of KB iff for any fresh individual a, D(a) is a logical consequence of KB ∪ {C(a)}. This approach is not correct for Circumscription. The models of CircF (KB) can be quite different from the models of CircF (KB ∪ {C(a)}); for instance, consider the example in which nonmonotonic reasoning makes Whale empty and the assertion Whale(Moby) overrides this inference.
This completes the proof for Circ var and Circ F . The proof for Circ fix can be obtained by replacing the fresh variable concept names A,C, andD with a corresponding (variable) concept ∃R, where R is a fresh role.
Note that the above reductions still apply if priorities are specificity-based (≺ K ), with the exception of the reduction of concept unsatisfiability to instance checking in EL ⊥ . For this case, one can use Theorem 4.6 below to eliminate general priorities, and get a reduction for Circ fix .
Complexity Preserving Features
In some cases, nonmonotonic inferences and language features-e.g. variable predicates and explicit priorities-do not affect complexity. In this section several such results (and related lemmata) are collected; the reader is warned that, in general, they may not apply to all reasoning tasks and all language fragments. We start by observing that the logics we deal with enjoy the finite model property.
has a model only if Circ F (KB) has a finite model whose size is exponential in the size of KB.
Proof. A simple adaptation of a result for ALCIO (Bonatti et al., 2006) , taking role hierarchies into account.
As a consequence, these logics preserve classical consistency (because all descending chains of models originating from a finite model must be finite): Since knowledge base consistency is equivalent to its classical version, it will not be discussed in this paper any further.
Next, we prove that under mild assumptions, Circ F is not more expressive than Circ fix (which is a special case of the former), that is, variable concept names do not increase the expressiveness of the logic and can be eliminated. 4 Theorem 4.4 If DL is a description logic fully supporting unqualified existential restrictions (∃ R), 5 then, for all F ⊆ N C , concept consistency, subsumption, and instance checking in Circ F (DL) can be reduced in linear time to concept consistency, subsumption, and instance checking (respectively) in Circ fix (DL).
Proof. Let KB be any given DKB in the language DL. Introduce a new role name R A for each (variable) concept name A ∈ F . Then, replace each occurrence of A in KB with ∃R A and call KB the resulting KB. Recall that in Circ fix (DL) all concept names are fixed and all roles are variable. Hence, the newly added roles R A behave in Circ fix (KB ) exactly in the same way as concepts A ∈ F do in Circ F (KB). Formally, there is a bijection between the models of Circ F (KB) and the models of Circ fix (KB ), which preserves the interpretation of all role and concept names, except that the extension of concept names A ∈ F in a model of Circ F (KB) coincides with the domain of the corresponding role R A in the corresponding model of Circ fix (KB ). As a consequence, the consistency of a concept C w.r.t. Circ F (KB) is equivalent to the consistency of C w.r.t. Circ fix (KB ), where C is obtained from C by replacing each occurrence of A ∈ F with the corresponding ∃R A . Similarly for subsumption and instance checking.
Symmetrically, the next theorem proves that in EL ⊥ fixed predicates can be eliminated using general priorities. The reduction adapts the classical encoding of fixed predicates to the limited expressiveness of EL ⊥ .
Theorem 4.5 For all F ⊆ N C , concept consistency, subsumption, and instance checking in Circ F (EL ⊥ ) can be reduced in linear time to concept consistency, subsumption, and instance checking (respectively) in Circ var (EL ⊥ ) with general priorities.
Fixed predicates are removed through the following transformation. For each concept name A ∈ F introduce a new concept nameĀ (representing ¬A). Let K * S be the set of all disjointness axioms A Ā ⊥, for each A ∈ F . Let K * D be the set of all defeasible inclusions n A and nĀ , for each A ∈ F . Finally, let ≺ be the minimal extension of ≺ such that for all δ * ∈ K * D and all δ ∈ K D , δ * ≺ δ. Define
Claim 1. Let J and J be two classical models of K S ∪ K * S such that J < K ,var J and for all A ∈ F ,Ā J = ¬A J . Then (i) for all δ ∈ K * D , sat J (δ) = sat J (δ) and (ii) J and J agree on all A ∈ F .
Proof of Claim 1: By definition of ≺ , the members of K * D have maximal priority, therefore, for
leads to a contradiction. This proves (i); (ii) is a straightforward consequence of (i).
Claim 2. Every model I of Circ F (K) can be extended to a model J of Circ var (K ).
To prove this claim, extend I to J by settingĀ J = ¬A I , for all concept names A ∈ F . Suppose that J is not a model of Circ var (K ). Since J satisfies K S ∪ K * S by construction, there must be a J that satisfies K S ∪ K * S and such that J < K ,var J . By Claim 1.(ii), J and J agree on all A ∈ F ; by Claim 1.(i), the improvement of J over J concerns the GDIs in K D . It follows that I < K,F I, where I is the restriction of J to the language of K. This contradicts the assumption that I is a model of Circ F (K).
Claim 3. For all models J of Circ var (K ), the restriction of J to the language of K is a model of Circ F (K).
Let I be the restriction of J to the language of K. Clearly I satisfies K S . Now suppose that I is not a model of Circ F (K), which means that there exists I satisfying K S and such that I < K,F I. Extend I to J by settingĀ J = ¬A I , for all concept names A ∈ F . Note that I and I must agree on all A ∈ F , therefore J and J agree on them, too. Consequently, for all
The Theorem is now a straightforward consequence of Claims 2 and 3. 2
Now consider priority relations and GDIs. We are going to prove that if the language fragment is sufficiently rich, then they can be simulated with the specificity-based relation ≺ K and normalized defeasible inclusions A n C (whose left-hand side is a concept name), respectively. Let KB = K, ≺ be any given DKB in EL ⊥ . First we need to define a new fixed concept Dom that encodes the domain without being equivalent to . This requires the following transformation:
Obtain K * from K by transforming all inclusions in K and by adding a nonemptiness axiom ∃aux .Dom (aux a fresh role) plus an assertion Dom(a) for each a ∈ N I occurring in K. It is not hard to see that the restrictions to Dom of the classical models of K * correspond to the classical models of K. More precisely, let I * be a classical model of K * , we obtain a classical model I of K by setting A I = A I * ∩ Dom
, for each concept name A and role name R occurring in K. Notice that it is necessary for Dom I * to be non-empty for this to work. Conversely, given a classical model I of K, it is sufficient to set Dom I = ∆ I and aux I = ∆ I × ∆ I to make I a classical model of K * . Now we have to remove general priorities and GDIs. For all GDIs δ = (C n D) ∈ K * , add two fresh predicates A δ , P δ and replace δ with the following axiom schemata:
Call the new DKB KB = K , ≺ K . By (16), the specificity-based relation ≺ K prioritizes the new GDIs according to the original priorities. Moreover, by (17), a defeasible inclusion A δ n ∃P δ is satisfied by an individual if and only if the same individual satisfies the corresponding GDI δ.
Then it is not difficult to verify that all the reasoning tasks such that none of the new predicates A δ and P δ occur in the query yield the same answer in K * , ≺ * and KB . As a consequence of the above discussion, by combining the transformation · * with (16) and (17), and by observing that the reduction makes use of EL ⊥ constructs only, we have:
Theorem 4.6 Reasoning in Circ fix (EL ⊥ ) with explicit priorities and GDIs can be reduced in polynomial time to reasoning in Circ fix (EL ⊥ ) with only specificity-based priority and defeasible inclusions of the form A n ∃P .
Finally, by Theorem 4.4, the above result can be extended to all of Circ F :
Corollary 4.7 Reasoning in Circ F (EL ⊥ ) with explicit priorities and GDIs can be reduced in polynomial time to reasoning in Circ fix (EL ⊥ ) with only specificity-based priority and defeasible inclusions of the form A n ∃P .
Undecidability of EL with Fixed Roles
In Circ * both concept names and roles can be fixed; however, as we show in this section, fixed roles in general make reasoning tasks undecidable. To this end, the model conservative extension problem defined by Lutz and Wolter (2010) is reduced to the subsumption problem. 6 Some preliminary definitions are needed; given a signature Σ ⊆ N C ∪ N R and two interpretations I and J , we say that I and J coincide on Σ if and only if ∆ I = ∆ J and for all predicates X ∈ Σ, X I = X J . Then, let T 1 ⊆ T 2 be classical EL TBoxes, T 2 is a model conservative extension of T 1 if and only if for every model I of T 1 , there exists a model J of T 2 such that I and J coincide on the signature of T 1 .
Lutz and Wolter (2010) prove (see Lemma 40) that there exists a class C of EL TBoxes such that the problem of checking whether a TBox in C is a model conservative extension of another TBox in C is undecidable. Moreover, the following property holds.
Lemma 5.1 Given two TBoxes T 1 ⊆ T 2 in C, if T 2 is not a model conservative extension of T 1 then there exists a model I of T 1 and an interpretation J of T 2 such that I and J coincide on the signature of T 1 and the set of individuals in J that violate at least one concept inclusion from T 2 is finite.
For a DKB KB = K S ∪ K D , ≺ and an interpretation I of KB, we denote by ab KB (I) (for abnormal) the total number of individuals x ∈ ∆ I such that x ∈ sat I (δ) for some δ ∈ K D .
Proof. It suffices to show that each < KB,F -chain descending from I is finite. Since DIs are incomparable with each other, each step in the < KB,F -chain must improve at least one DI and leave all other DIs unchanged. Formally, if I < KB,F I then there exists at least a DI δ ∈ K D such that sat I (δ) ⊂ sat I (δ) and for all δ ∈ K D it holds sat I (δ ) ⊆ sat I (δ ). Hence, ab KB (I ) < ab KB (I) and the thesis follows.
Assume that T 1 , T 2 ∈ C are given, where T 1 ⊆ T 2 , and let Σ be the signature of T 1 . Let F = Σ and KB = K, ∅ where
. By Lemma 5.1, we can consider a model I of T 1 and an extension J of I on the signature of T 2 , such that the set of individuals that violate in J at least one inclusion of T 2 is finite. Since J is a classical model of KB and ab KB (J ) is finite, by Lemma 5.2, there exists a model J of Circ * F (KB) such that either J = J or J < KB,F J . Since Circ * F (KB) entails T 2 and F = Σ, J is a (classical) model of T 2 that coincides with J and I on Σ (absurdum).
6. The sketch of this proof has been kindly provided by Frank Wolter in a personal communication. Any imprecision in the proof is due to the authors.
[only if ] Suppose by contradiction that T 2 is a model conservative extension of T 1 , and for somê
Since I is a model of T 1 and T 2 is a model conservative extension of T 1 , there exists an interpretation J that (i) coincides with I on Σ and (ii) is a model of T 2 , i.e., for all defeasible inclusions
Since checking whether a TBox is a model conservative extension of another one has been proved to be undecidable for C ⊆ EL (Lutz & Wolter, 2010) , it immediately follows that subsumption in Circ * F (EL) is undecidable. Moreover, since subsumption can be reduced to concept unsatisfiability or instance checking (Theorem 3.9), the latter reasoning tasks are undecidable as well.
Theorem 5.4 In Circ * F (EL), subsumption, concept consistency and instance checking are undecidable.
Complexity of Circumscribed DL-lite R
In this section we focus on DL-lite R DKBs. We first prove that in Circ var (DL-lite R ) the reasoning tasks are complete for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. From this, according to Theorem 4.4, we immediately obtain an hardness result for Circ fix (DL-lite R ) too. Then, the membership for Circ fix (DL-lite R ) to second level of the polynomial hierarchy is shown for the fragment of DKBs with left-fixed defeasible inclusions, i.e. defeasible inclusions of type A n C.
Complexity of Circ var (DL-lite R )
In this section we prove that Circ var (DL-lite R ) subsumption, concept unsatisfiability (co-sat) and instance checking are complete for Π p 2 . Our membership results rely on the possibility of extracting a small (polynomial) model from any model of a circumscribed DKB.
Lemma 6.1 Let KB be a DL-lite R DKB. For all models I of Circ var (KB) and all x ∈ ∆ I there exists a model
is a model of Circ var (KB), and x ∈ ∆ I . Let cl(KB) be the set of all concepts occurring in KB. Choose a minimal set ∆ ⊆ ∆ I containing:
Note that by construction, for all z ∈ ∆ J and for all C ∈ cl(KB), z ∈ C J iff z ∈ C I ; consequently, J is a classical model of S. Moreover, the cardinality of ∆ J is linear in the size of KB (by construction). So we are only left to show that J is a < K D ,var -minimal model of KB.
Suppose not, and consider any J < K D ,var J . Define I as follows:
Note that the elements in ∆ I \∆ J satisfy no left-hand side of any DL-lite R inclusion (be it classical or defeasible), therefore all inclusions are vacuously satisfied.
Moreover, the restriction of I to ∆ J is < K D ,var -smaller than the corresponding restriction of I in the interpretation ordering. It follows that I < K D ,var I, and hence I cannot be a model of Circ var (KB) (a contradiction).
2 To illustrate Lemma 6.1, consider the DKB KB in Figure 2 (a) and the model I in Figure 2 (b). Note that all individuals in I satisfy the defeasible inclusion in KB. The "small" model J , depicted in Figure 2 (c), is obtained as follows. First, it contains the designated individual x; then, for each concept ∃R that occurs in KB and is satisfied in I (where R is a possibly inverse role), it contains a representative y R that receives role R in I. In our case, assume that the chosen representatives are: y Q = 6, y Q − = 4, y S = 8, and y T = 7. Hence, ∆ J = {x, 6, 4, 8, 7}. The roles in J are obtained by connecting each individual z that satisfies a concept ∃P in I to the chosen representative y P . For instance, since 4 satisfies ∃S in I, we have the edge (4, 8) ∈ S J . Moreover, the representative for an inverse role P − is connected to all nodes that satisfy the concept ∃P − in I. In our case, since 4 is the representative for Q − and 6 satisfies ∃Q − , we have the edge (4, 6) ∈ Q J . Besides, since 4 itself satisfies ∃Q − , we also have (4, 4) ∈ Q J . It can be verified by inspection that J is a model of Circ var (KB), as its individuals satisfy all classical and defeasible inclusions in KB. Proof. By Lemma 6.1, it suffices to guess a polynomial size model that provides an answer to the given reasoning problem. Then, with an NP oracle, it is possible to check that the model is minimal w.r.t. < var .
The complexity upper bounds proved by Theorem 6.2 are in fact tight, as stated by Theorem 6.6. The proof of hardness is based on the reduction of the minimal-entailment problem of positive disjunctive logic programs -which has been proved to be Π p 2 -hard (Eiter & Gottlob, 1995) . A clause is a formula l 1 ∨ · · · ∨ l h , where the l i are literals over a set of propositional variables P V = {p 1 , . . . , p n }. A positive disjunctive logic program (PDLP for short) is a set of clauses S = {c 1 , . . . , c m } where each c j contains at least one positive literal. A truth valuation for S is a set I ⊆ P V , containing the propositional variables which are true. A truth valuation is a model of S if it satisfies all clauses in S. For a literal l, we write S |= min l if and only if every minimal 7 model of S satisfies l. The minimal-entailment problem can be then defined as follows: given a PDLP S and a literal l, determine whether S |= min l.
For each propositional variable p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we introduce two concept names P i andP i , where the latter encodes ¬p i . We denote by L j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, a generic P i orP i . For each clause c j ∈ S we introduce the concept name C j . Then, two other concept names True and False represent the set of true and false literals, respectively. We employ roles RL i , RTrueC j , RFalseP i , RTrueP i , and TL i .
In the following, defeasible inclusions δ are assigned a numerical priority h(δ), with the intended meaning that
The first step consists in reifying all the propositional literals, i.e., we want each of them to correspond to an individual. Therefore, we introduce the axioms:
Axioms (18-21) force the literal encodings L i to be non empty. Axioms (22) make literal encodings pairwise disjoint. Finally, defeasible inclusions (23) are used to reduce the L i to singletons. Then, we represent the set of clauses S by adding for each clause c j = l j1 ∨ · · · ∨ l jk , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the following axioms.
Axioms (24-25) ensure that each (encoding of a) clause C j is the union of its literals L ji . Axioms (26-29) assure that each clause contains at least one true literal. In order to model the concepts 7. With respect to set inclusion.
True and False and the correct meaning of complementary literals we add the following axioms.
The previous schemata regard TrueP i only; analogous schemata are defined for FalseP i . The following inclusions ensure that the truth of a given literal is locally visible in the individual a, through the auxiliary roles TL i .
The axioms defined so far encode the classical semantics of S. To represent only minimal models we add the following axioms.
Given a PDLP S, we call the KB defined above KB S . Given a truth assignment I ⊆ P V and a domain ∆ = {a, d 1 , . . . , d 2n }, we define a corresponding interpretation, denoted by model (S, I, ∆), whose structure mirrors I. Formally, model (S, I, ∆) is the interpretation I = (∆, · I ) such that:
where X Y is a concept name obtained by concatenating two other concept names X and Y (for instance, concept name TrueC j is obtained by concatenating concept names True and C j ); in other words, juxtaposition represents conjunction;
The following lemma, proved in the Appendix, states the relationship between I and model (S, I, ∆).
Lemma 6.3 Given a PDLP S over P V = {p 1 , . . . , p n } and a truth assignment I ⊆ P V , I is a minimal model of S iff the interpretation model (S, I, ∆) is a model of Circ var (KB S ), for all domains ∆ with |∆| = 2n + 1.
The following result, also proved in the Appendix, shows that any model of Circ var (KB S ) in fact corresponds to a minimal model of S.
Lemma 6.4 If I is a model of Circ var (KB S ), then there exist a minimal model I of S such that p i ∈ I iff P I i ⊆ True I iffP I i ⊆ False I , for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Lemma 6.5 Given a PDLP S and a literal l represented by concept name L, the following are equivalent:
(co-sat) FalseL is not satisfiable w.r.t Circ var (KB S );
Proof. The three inference problems on KB S represent the fact that for all models I of Circ var (KB S ) we have that L I ∩True I is not empty -co-sat in particular relies on the fact that in all Circ var (KB S ) models True and False are a partition of the individuals belonging to the literal concepts. Therefore, it suffices to prove that l is true in all minimal models of S iff L I ∩ True I = ∅ in all models of Circ var (KB S ). Lemma 6.3 establishes a bijection between minimal models I of S and certain models I = model (S, I, ∆) of Circ var (KB S ), such that the truth of a literal l in I corresponds to the inclusion of L I into True I in I (see rule VI in the definition of model ). Therefore, the right-to-left direction is immediately satisfied. For the left-to-right direction, assume that l is true in all minimal models of S and let I be a model of Circ var (KB S ). By Lemma 6.4, there is a minimal model I of S such that p i ∈ I iff P I i ⊆ True I . If l = p i , we conclude L I ⊆ True I and the thesis. Similarly, for l =p i . 2
The following theorem provides complexity lower-bounds for the main decision problems of both Circ var (DL-lite R ) and Circ fix (DL-lite R ). The result for Circ var (DL-lite R ) follows immediately from Lemma 6.5, and it extends to Circ fix (DL-lite R ) due to Theorem 4.4. Theorem 6.6 Subsumption, co-sat and instance checking over circumscribed DL-lite R DKBs with general priorities are Π p 2 -hard.
Upper Bound of Circ fix (DL-lite R ) with Restrictions
We develop the same argument used for Circ var (DL-lite R ) to prove similar upper bounds for Circ fix (DL-lite R ) DKBs with left-fixed DIs (i.e., their left-hand side is fixed or-equivalentlya concept name) or empty priority relations. Whether the same upper bounds apply to Circ fix (DL-lite R ) without any restriction is left as an open question.
Lemma 6.7 Let KB be a DL-lite R knowledge base whose DIs are left-fixed. For all models I of Circ fix (KB) and all x ∈ ∆ I there exists a model J of Circ fix (KB) such that (i) ∆ J ⊆ ∆ I , (ii) x ∈ ∆ J , (iii) for all DL-lite R concepts C, x ∈ C I iff x ∈ C J , and (iv) |∆ J | is polynomial in the size of KB.
Proof. Assume that I is a model of Circ fix (KB), with KB = K S ∪ K D , ≺ , and x ∈ ∆ I . Let cl(KB) be the set of all concepts occurring in KB. Choose a minimal set ∆ ⊆ ∆ I containing: (i) x, (ii) all a I such that a ∈ N I ∩ cl(KB), (iii) for each concept ∃R in cl(KB) satisfied in I, a node y R such that y R ∈ (∃R − ) I (where ∃P −− is considered equivalent to ∃P ), and finally (iv) for all inclusions
, and (iv) P J = {(z, y P ) | z ∈ ∆ and z ∈ ∃P I } ∪ {(y P , z) | z ∈ ∆ and z ∈ ∃P − I } (P ∈ N R ).
Note that by construction, for all z ∈ ∆ J and for all C ∈ cl(KB), z ∈ C J iff z ∈ C I ; consequently, J is a classical model of KB. Moreover, the cardinality of ∆ J is linear in the size of KB (by construction). So we are only left to show that J is a < fix -minimal model of KB.
Suppose not, and consider any J < fix J . Define I as follows: (a)
and for all inclusions C ∃R or C n ∃R in KB such that z ∈ (C ∃R) I , if R J contains a pair (v, w), then (z, w) ∈ R I ; finally, (d3) each P I is closed under the role inclusion axioms of KB. Note that, by construction, (*) for all z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J , z ∈ ∃R I only if z ∈ ∃R I ; (**) for all z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J , z ∈ ∃R I only if there exists v ∈ ∆ J such that v ∈ ∃R J . Now we prove that I is a classical model of KB. By construction, the edges (z, w) introduced in (d2) do not change the set of existential restrictions satisfied by the members of ∆ J ; as a consequence -and since J is a model of KB-the members of ∆ J satisfy all the classical CIs of KB.
Now consider an arbitrary element z ∈ ∆ I \∆ J and any CI γ of K S . If γ is an inclusion without existential quantifiers, then I and I give the same interpretation to γ by definition, therefore z satisfies γ. If γ is ∃R A, ∃R ¬A, ∃R ¬∃S, or A ¬∃R (and considering that I satisfies γ) z fails to satisfy γ only if for some R ∈ {R, S}, z ∈ (∃R ) I and z ∈ (∃R ) I ; this is impossible by (*). Next, suppose γ is ∃R ∃S. If z ∈ (∃R) I , then by (**) there exists a v ∈ ∆ J satisfying (∃R) J and hence (∃S) J (as J is a model of K S ), therefore z ∈ (∃S) I (by d2). We are only left to consider γ = A ∃R: If z ∈ A I = A I , then there exists w A ∈ A J (by construction of ∆) and w A ∈ (∃R) J because J is a model of KB. Then z ∈ (∃R) I by (d2). Therefore, in all possible cases, z satisfies γ.
This proves that I satisfies all the strong CIs of KB. It is not hard to verify that I satisfies also all role inclusions of KB. Therefore, in order to derive a contradiction, we are left to show that I < fix I (which implies that I is not a model of Circ fix (KB)). Since by assumption J < fix J , it suffices to prove the following claim:
In ∆ J , I and J (resp. I and J ) satisfy the same concepts, therefore we only need to show that for all z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J , if z ∈ sat I (δ) then z ∈ sat I (δ). In all cases but those in which the right-hand side of δ is ∃R, the proof is similar to the proof for strong CIs (it exploits (*) and the fact that concept names are fixed). Let δ be A n ∃R and consider an arbitrary z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J such that z ∈ sat I (δ). Since concept names are fixed, the only interesting case is that z actively satisfies δ, i.e. z ∈ (A ∃R) I . By construction, ∆ contains an individual v ∈ (A ∃R) J . Since by hypothesis sat J (δ) ⊆ sat J (δ), v ∈ (A ∃R) J and hence, by (d2), z ∈ (∃R) I , that is z ∈ sat I (δ).
To prove the same lemma under the assumption that the priority relation is empty we need some preliminary notions. Given a KB KB = K S ∪ K D , ≺ , an interpretation I and an individual z ∈ ∆ I , we denote with KB
[z] the classical knowledge base:
Then, the support of a concept C in I, supp I (C), is the set of individuals z ∈ ∆ I such that, for some A, z ∈ A I and A KB [z] C. If z ∈ supp I (C) we say that z supports C in I.
Lemma 6.8 Let KB = K, ∅ be a DL-lite R knowledge base. For all models I of Circ fix (KB) and all x ∈ ∆ I there exists a model J of Circ fix (KB) such that (i) ∆ J ⊆ ∆ I , (ii) x ∈ ∆ J , (iii) for all DL-lite R concepts C, x ∈ C I iff x ∈ C J , and (iv) |∆ J | is polynomial in the size of KB.
Proof. Assume that I is a model of Circ fix (KB) and let ∆ ⊆ ∆ I be defined as in the above proof of Lemma 6.7, except for case (iv), which is replaced by: (iv') for all inclusions C [n] ∃R in KB such that supp I (∃R) = ∅, a node w ∃R ∈ supp I (∃R). That is, for each inclusion whose RHS is variable, we pick a witness that is in the support of the RHS, if such a witness exists. Next, define J as in the proof of Lemma 6.7. As before, J is a classical model of KB and the cardinality of ∆ J is linear in the size of KB. We are left to show that J is < fix -minimal. Suppose not, and consider any J < fix J . Since the priority relation is empty, for all DIs δ in KB, sat J (δ) ⊆ sat J (δ). Hence, for all concepts C it holds supp J (C) ⊆ supp J (C). Define I as in the proof of Lemma 6.7, except for case (d2), which is replaced by: (d2') for all z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J , and for all inclusions C [n] ∃R in KB such that z ∈ supp I (∃R), if R J contains a pair (v, w), then (z, w) ∈ R I . We prove that I < fix I, contradicting the hypothesis that I is a model of Circ fix (KB). The only non-trivial case consists in proving that the individuals in ∆ I \ ∆ J satisfy in I the same inclusions of type C [n] ∃S that they satisfy in I.
Assume that z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J satisfies C [n] ∃S in I; we distinguish two cases. First, if z ∈ supp I (∃S), we have that ∆ J contains a witness w ∃S s.t. w ∃S ∈ supp J (∃S) ⊆ supp J (∃S). Therefore, there exists a pair (w ∃S , y) ∈ S J and, by (d2'), (z, y) ∈ S I . Second, assume that z ∈ supp I (∃S). Since z ∈ sat I (C [n] D), we have that z ∈ supp I (C). Therefore, if C = A, then z ∈ A I = A I , whereas if C = ∃R, then by (d2') z ∈ (∃R) I . In both cases, z vacuously satisfies δ in I . 
Proof. Let I be any model of Circ var (KB), and let J be the interpretation such that (i) ∆ J = ∆ I , (ii) for all a ∈ N I , a J = a I , (iii) for all A ∈ N C , A J = ∆ J , and (iv) for all P ∈ N R , P J = ∆ J × ∆ J . It can be easily verified by structural induction that for all EL concepts C, C J = ∆ J and hence each domain element of J satisfies all EL inclusions (strong and defeasible). Then, clearly, J is a model of Circ var (KB). Consequently, for all δ ∈ K D , sat I (δ) = ∆ I , otherwise J < var I (a contradiction). It follows that I is a classical model of K S ∪K D .
By the results of the work of Baader et al. (2005) , it follows that in Circ var (EL), concept satisfiability is trivial, subsumption and instance checking are in P.
Remark 7.2 Clearly, the same argument and the same result apply to Circ var (ELHO).
If we make EL more interesting by adding ⊥ as a source of inconsistency, then complexity increases significantly.
Theorem 7.3 In Circ var (EL ⊥ ), concept satisfiability, instance checking, and subsumption are ExpTime-hard. These results still hold if knowledge bases contain no assertion. 8
Proof. Let EL
¬A be the extension of EL where atomic concepts can be negated. We first reduce TBox satisfiability in EL ¬A (which is known to be ExpTime-hard, see Baader et al., 2005) to the complement of subsumption in Circ var (EL ⊥ ). Let T be a TBox (i.e., a set of CIs) in EL ¬A . First introduce for each concept name A occurring in T a fresh concept nameĀ whose intended meaning is ¬A. Obtain T from T by replacing each literal ¬A withĀ. Let KB = K, ≺ K be the DKB obtained by extending T with the following inclusions, where U and U A -for all A occurring in T -are fresh concept names (representing undefined truth values), and R is a fresh role name:
We prove that T is satisfiable iff in some model of Circ var (KB) all U A 's are empty, which holds iff Circ var (KB) |= ∃R.U . Consequently, subsumption in Circ var (EL ⊥ ) is ExpTime-hard. Assume that T is satisfiable and I is a model of T with domain ∆ I . From I we define an interpretation 8. Equivalently, in DL's terminology: ABoxes are empty.
J that is a model of Circ var (KB) such that U J = ∅, thus proving that Circ var (KB) |= ∃R.U . J has the same domain as I, and all concepts and roles occurring in T have the same interpretation as in I; we only need to define the interpretation of the newly introduced conceptsĀ, U A , and U , and of the role R. We setĀ J = ∆ I \ A I and U
By construction J is a model of the classical inclusions in KB, in particular CIs (42)-(45). It remains to prove that J is minimal w.r.t. < var , i.e., it is not possible to improve any DI δ without violating another DI that is either incomparable with δ, or has a higher priority than δ. Notice that defeasible inclusions (46) (resp., (47)) are violated by all individuals not in A J (resp., all individuals in A J ). DIs (48) and (49) ∃R.U , and let I be a model of Circ var (KB) with an individual x ∈ ∆ I such that x ∈ (∃R.U ) I . Due to rule (45), x ∈ (∃R.U A ) I for all atomic concepts A. Hence, x violates all DIs of type (49). If there exists a concept U A such that (U A ) I is not empty, then the model obtained from I by adding an R-edge from x to an individual in (U A ) I is smaller than I according to < var , which is a contradiction. Therefore, all concepts U A are empty in I.
Next, we show that for all atomic concepts A and all individuals y ∈ ∆ I , either y ∈ A I or y ∈Ā I . Assume the contrary, i.e., there exists an individual y which belongs neither to A I nor tō A I . Then, y violates all DIs (46)-(49). Consider the interpretation I , obtained from I by setting (U A ) I = U I = {y}. By construction I satisfies all CIs in KB. Compared to I, the status of the DIs is the same, except that in I the individual y satisfies (48). Hence, I < var I, which is a contradiction. Since each individual belongs to either A I orĀ I , we can convert I into a classical model of T , thus showing that T is satisfiable.
Similarly, for any given a ∈ N I , T is satisfiable iff there exists a model I of Circ var (KB) such that a I ∈ (∃R.U ) I . Therefore, instance checking in Circ var (EL ⊥ ) is ExpTime-hard as well. Finally, add a fresh concept name B and all the inclusions B ∃R.U A ⊥; call the new DKB KB . Note that T is satisfiable iff in some model of Circ var (KB) all U A 's are empty, which holds iff B is satisfiable w.r.t. Circ var (KB ). Consequently, concept satisfiability in Circ var (EL ⊥ ) is ExpTime-hard.
Since Circ var is a special case of Circ F , and by Theorem 4.4, the above theorem applies to Circ F and Circ fix , too:
Corollary 7.4 For X = F, fix, concept satisfiability checking, instance checking, and subsumption in Circ X (EL ⊥ ) are ExpTime-hard. These results still hold if ABoxes are empty (i.e. assertions are not allowed).
Fixed concept names can play a role similar to ⊥, so that the above proof can be adapted to Circ F (EL).
Theorem 7.5 Instance checking and subsumption are ExpTime-hard both in Circ F (EL) and in Circ fix (EL). The same holds in the restriction of EL not supporting .
Proof. We reduce satisfiability of an EL
¬A TBox T to the complement of subsumption in Circ F (EL). First we have to introduce a new concept name D representing and translate each concept C in EL ¬A into a corresponding C * in EL, as follows:
• C * = C if C is a concept name;
• C * =Ā if C is ¬A (for all A,Ā is a new concept name);
Then we extend the translated TBox with the following inclusions, where Bot (representing ⊥), all U A 's, and Bad are new concept names and R is a new role name:
D(a) (ABox assertion) (64)
Let KB = K, ≺ K be the resulting DKB, and set F = {D, Bot}. We prove that the following three properties are equivalent: (i) T is satisfiable, (ii) Circ F (KB) |= D Bad , and (iii) Circ F (KB) |= Bad (a).
Let us prove that (ii) implies (i).
Let I be a model of Circ F (KB) with an individual x s.t. x ∈ D I and x ∈ Bad I . By (62)-(63), x ∈ (∃R.U A ) I for all A, and x ∈ (∃R.Bad ) I . By (59), x ∈ (D ) I . Hence, x violates DIs (60) and (61). Assume that at least one concept U A is not empty in I (resp., Bot is not empty in I). Then, I can be improved (according to < F ) by connecting with an R-edge the individual x with the non-empty concept U A (resp., Bot), and then adding x to Bad (notice that Bad is a variable concept). This being a contradiction, we conclude that Bot and all U A 's are empty in I. Then, we prove that the restriction of I to the domain D I is a model of T .
Inclusions (50)- (51) ensure that all individuals satisfying either A orĀ are in D I . DIs (56)-(57), together with the fact that all U A 's are empty, guarantee that each individual in D I satisfies either A orĀ, for all concept names A. Rules (53), together with the fact that Bot is empty, guarantee that no individual satisfies both A andĀ. The translation from C to C * completes our claim.
Next, we show that (i) implies (ii). Let I be a model of T . We extend I to become a model Since Bot is a fixed concept, inclusions (53)- (55) ensure that A,Ā and U A are mutually exclusive, for all concepts A. Hence, each DI of type (56)- (58) can only be improved at the expenses of another DI of incomparable priority, which does not count as an improvement according to < F . DI (61) cannot be improved because Bot is empty and fixed. Finally, suppose one tries to improve one of the DIs of type (60). To do so, at least one individual x must enter the concept U A . Due to the mutual exclusion property described earlier, x needs to exit from A (resp.Ā), thus violating DI (56) (resp., (57)), which has a higher priority than (60) due to (59).
The equivalence between (i) and (iii) can be proved along similar lines. Just notice that the fact (64) makes Bad (a) equivalent to the inclusion D Bad . The thesis for Circ fix is obtained as a consequence of Theorem 4.4. 2
Concept consistency is simpler, instead. Call an interpretation I complete iff for all A ∈ N C , A I = ∆ I , and for all P ∈ N R , P I = ∆ I × ∆ I . It is not hard to verify that all EL concepts and all EL inclusions (both classical and defeasible) are satisfied by all x ∈ ∆ I , therefore complete models are always models of Circ F (KB), for all DKBs KB and all F ⊆ N C . As a consequence we have that concept consistency is trivial: Theorem 7.6 For all EL concepts C, DKBs KB, and F ⊆ N C , C is satisfied by some model of Circ F (KB).
Left Local EL ⊥ and Circ var
In this subsection and in the next one, we prove that qualified existentials in the left-hand side of inclusions are responsible for the higher complexity of EL ⊥ w.r.t. DL-lite R . In particular, qualified existentials in the left-hand side make the proof strategy of Lemma 6.7 fail: when the target of an edge which starts in x is redirected, the individual x may satisfy a qualified existential restriction that it did not satisfy before. If so, the truth value of inclusions may be affected. By limiting the occurrences of qualified existential restrictions in the left-hand side of inclusions, it is possible to reduce significantly the complexity of instance checking and subsumption in circumscribed EL ⊥ . Figure 3 summarizes the syntactic fragments of EL ⊥ that we consider. We start with the following class of knowledge bases: Definition 7.7 A defeasible knowledge base K, ≺ is in the full left local (LL f ) fragment of EL ⊥ iff the left-hand sides of the inclusions of K contain no qualified existential restrictions.
Note that this restriction rules out all the acyclic terminologies containing a qualified existential restriction, and hence most of the existing ontologies of practical interest. Therefore, we introduce the following relaxation of LL f EL ⊥ :
Definition 7.8 An EL ⊥ knowledge base KB = K, ≺ is almost LL (aLL for short) iff (i) K = K LL ∪ K a , (ii) K LL is in LL f , (iii) K a is a classical acyclic terminology, and (iv) if a concept name A defined in K a occurs in the left-hand side of an inclusion in K LL , then A does not depend (in K a ) on any qualified existential restriction.
In other words, by unfolding K LL with respect to K a , we obtain a LL f knowledge base.
Example 7.9 Example 3.1 can be reformulated in aLL EL ⊥ :
Human n ∃has lhs heart ; ∃has lhs heart ∃has rhs heart ⊥ ; Situs Inversus ≡ Human ∃has rhs heart .
Here K LL consists of the first two axioms and K a consists of the third axiom. Note that, in general, a concept name A occurring in a terminology T can be extended with default properties by means of an inclusion A n C in the following cases: A can be a primitive concept (with no definition in T ), or a concept partially defined by a one-way inclusion (e.g. Human Mammal), or even a concept with a complete definition A ≡ D in T , provided that A does not depend on any qualified existentials. Accordingly, in this example, we could add a defeasible inclusion like Situs Inversus n C, that would not be permitted if the definition of situs inversus depended on qualified existential restrictions as in Situs Inversus ≡ Human ∃has heart. ∃has position. Right . 2
A small model property similar to Lemma 6.7 can be proved for Circ var (aLL EL ⊥ ) provided that the right-hand side of subsumption queries has bounded quantifier depth. It is convenient to split the proof into a proof for LL f EL ⊥ and later extend it to aLL EL ⊥ . Since in LL f EL ⊥ the RHS of an inclusion may have nested qualified existential restrictions, it is difficult to prove the small model property when considering the entire language. For this reason, we prove it indirectly: first we show how to transform a knowledge base KB into another KB * that yields the following properties: (i) no nested formulas occur, (ii) defeasible inclusions are only of type A n B, (iii) every model I ∈ Circ var (KB) can be extended to a model of Circ var (KB * ) on the same domain and (iv) every model of Circ var (KB * ) is a model of Circ var (KB). Then, we prove a small model property for the fragment with no nesting and, thanks to properties (iii) and (iv), we recover the small model property for the entire language.
Each LL f EL ⊥ inclusion C [n] D is transformed in three steps. Note that C's shape is:
In the first step, C is replaced by a fresh concept name F 0 (for convenience, we later refer to F 0 also as F C ) and the following axioms are added:
if m = 0, i.e., there are no existentials in C, add the inclusion:
Otherwise, add the following inclusions:
where the F i , G j and B j are fresh concept names. At this point, the initial inclusion
To eliminate the nesting in D, in the second step we replace it with a fresh concept name F D and add the inclusion F D D * , where · * is recursively defined as 
Now we prove the properties (iii) and (iv) mentioned above.
Lemma 7.10 Every model of Circ var (KB) can be extended to a model of Circ var (KB * ) on the same domain.
Proof. First, note that inclusions (65)- (73) are definitorial, that is every interpretation I of KB has exactly one extension that satisfies them. This extension, for simplicity we continue to call it I, is obtained by setting
Then, we can extend I by recursively setting F I H = H I , for each fresh concept F H introduced in step 2. It is straightforward to see by structural induction on H that (H * ) I = H I , and hence all inclusions in step 2 and 3 are satisfied. Thus, if I is a classical model of KB, then it is also a classical model of KB * . Assume now that I is a model of Circ var (KB), we have to show that I is minimal also with respect to KB * . Suppose not, and let J be a classical model of KB * such that J < KB * ,var I. By structural induction it is straightforward to see that for all
Since F J C = C J holds for all fresh concept names F C occurring in the LHS of a rule, we have that for each inclusion
The previous arguments entail that if
). Therefore, it would follow that J < KB,var I, which contradicts the hypothesis. 2
Lemma 7.11 All models of Circ var (KB * ) are models of Circ var (KB).
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 7.10, in particular we already know that (i) if an individual satisfies an inclusion
, for each (possibly defeasible) inclusion in KB. From this, we have that every classical model of KB * is a classical model of KB and, by assuming that some classical model J of KB improves I (i.e. J < KB,var I), it follows that J can be extended into a classical model of KB * such that J < KB * ,var I. 2
The following result, whose proof can be found in the Appendix, represents a small model property for LL f EL ⊥ , which uses the above transformation of KB into KB * .
Lemma 7.12 Let KB = K, ≺ K be an LL f EL ⊥ knowledge base, and C, D be EL ⊥ concepts. For all models I ∈ Circ var (KB) and for all x ∈ C I \ D I there exists a model J ∈ Circ var (KB) such
Now we have to extend the above result to aLL EL ⊥ . First, we show under which conditions the concept names defined in K a can be removed by unfolding them, using the unf operator defined in Section 2. The proofs of the following two propositions can be found in the Appendix. Proposition 7.13 Let KB = K LL ∪ K a , ≺ be an aLL EL ⊥ knowledge base. Every model of Circ F (unf(KB)) can be extended to a model of Circ F (KB).
The converse holds only if defined predicates are variable. The reason is that by adding a definition like A ≡ ∃P where A is fixed, one fixes the expression ∃P , too, thereby changing its semantics.
Proposition 7.14 Let KB = K LL ∪ K a , ≺ be an aLL EL ⊥ knowledge base and suppose that all the concept names defined in K a are variable. Then, for all models I of Circ F (KB), the restriction of I to primitive predicates is a model of Circ F (unf(KB)).
With these lemmata we can prove:
Lemma 7.15 Let KB = K, ≺ K be an aLL EL ⊥ knowledge base (where K = K a ∪ K LL ) and let C, D be EL ⊥ concepts. For all models I ∈ Circ var (KB) and for all x ∈ C I \ D I there exists a model J ∈ Circ var (KB) such that
Proof. Let I ∈ Circ var (KB) and x ∈ C I \ D I . Let KB = unf(KB), C = unf(C, K a ), and D = unf(D, K a ). Notice that KB is a LL f knowledge base. By Proposition 7.14, the restriction I of I to primitive predicates is a model of Circ var (KB ). In particular, it holds that x ∈ (C ) I \(D ) I . By applying Lemma 7.12 to KB , C , D , and I , we obtain that there exists a model J of Circ var (KB ) ∃R, for a fresh role R. Note the similarity of LL schemata with the normal form of EL inclusions (Baader et al., 2005) that, however, would allow the more general inclusions ∃P.A B and ∃P 1 .A ∃P 2 .B (that are forbidden by left locality). Now we prove that reasoning in Circ var (LL EL ⊥ ) is hard (and hence complete) for Σ p 2 and Π p 2 . For this purpose, we provide a reduction of minimal entailment over positive, propositional disjunctive logic programs (PDLP), defined in Section 6.1. For each propositional variable p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, introduce two concept names P i andP i -where the latter encodes ¬p i . In the following we will denote by L j , 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, a generic P i orP i . For each clause c j ∈ S introduce a concept name C j . Then, two other concept names True and False represent the set of true and false literals respectively. Finally, the concept names Lit and Min are used to model minimal propositional assignments; we need also an auxiliary role R.
First, literals are reified, i.e. modeled as individuals, with the axioms:
The first axiom makes all L i nonempty. Axioms (78) make them pairwise disjoint. Finally, axioms (79) minimize the concepts L i and make them singletons. Then, we represent S by adding for each
By axioms (80) and (81), C j equals the set of (encodings of) literals in c j . Axioms (82) make sure that each clause holds. In order to model the concepts True and False and the correct meaning of complementary literals we add the axioms
The axioms defined so far encode the classical semantics of S. To minimize models, add the following axioms:
By (88) and (89), Min collects false positive literals and true negative literals. By (90) and (91), Lit contains all the (representations of) literals and clauses. The purpose of these axioms is giving defeasible inclusions (79) and (81) higher (specificity-based) priority than (92), so that model minimization cannot cause any L i to be larger than a singleton, nor any C j to be different from the set of literals of c j . Now (92) prefers those models where as many P i as possible are in False.
In the following, given a PDLP S, let KB S be the Tbox defined above.
Lemma 7.18 Given a PDLP S, a literal l in S's language, and the encoding L of l, the following are equivalent:
This lemma can be proved by analogy with the proof of Lemma 6.5; the details are left to the reader. The conjunctions ( ) nested in ∃ can be easily replaced with a new atom A by adding the equivalence A ≡ True L, that can itself be encoded in LL EL ⊥ , so we have: By a reduction of the validity problem for quantified Boolean formula, we can show that Circ fix (aLL EL ⊥ ) is more complex than Circ var (aLL EL ⊥ ), unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses. Computing the truth of a quantified Boolean formula
(where the Q i 's are quantifiers) can be reduced in polynomial time to subsumption checking in Circ fix (aLL EL ⊥ ) as follows. Introduce concept names A 0 , . . . , A n , T i and F i for i = 1 . . . n, and concept names E j i for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Introduce role names R, bad , good , and U i for i = 1 . . . n. We define a aLLEL ⊥ knowledge base K, ≺ K , where
The left-local part K LL consists of the following groups of axioms. Notice that, in the following description, i is always an arbitrary index in {1, . . . , n}. First, we encode the negation normal formφ of ¬ϕ. Let B p i = T i and B ¬p i = F i . For all subformulas F ∧ G ofφ introduce a new concept name B F ∧G and add the inclusion B F B G B F ∧G . For all subformulas F ∨ G ofφ introduce a new concept name B F ∨G and add the inclusions B F B F ∨G and B G B F ∨G .
The second group of axioms of K LL constrains T i and F i to avoid inconsistencies. Intuitively ∃U i means "p i is undefined":
The third group of axioms of K LL defines a tree that encodes the truth assignments needed to evaluate the QBF:
The fourth group of axioms of K LL detects misrepresentations by forcing role bad to point to the nodes of the evaluation tree where something is going wrong (i.e. the truth assignment is incomplete, or some predicate changes value along a branch, or ϕ is false in a leaf).
(E j i andÊ j i are defined in K a below). Finally, good captures the absence of bad :
The acyclic terminology K a has the only purpose of detecting whether some propositional symbol changes its value along a path:
Lemma 7.20 Let I be a model of Circ fix (KB) that satisfies A 0 ∃good . For all i = 1 . . . n, all the individuals in ∆ I are contained in either
Proof. First, by contradiction, assume that for some i = 1 . . . n and x ∈ ∆ I i , x is neither in F I i nor in T I i . Since axioms (93)- (95) do not prevent x from satisfying ∃U i and I must be minimal w.r.t. axiom (99), then the entire domain ∆ I satisfies ∃bad .∃U i . However, by axiom (103), this means that A 0 ∃good is unsatisfiable against the hypothesis. 2
Lemma 7.21 Let I be a model of Circ fix (KB) that satisfies A 0 ∃good . If for some i = 1 . . . n,
and (x j−1 , x j ) ∈ R I , where i < j ≤ n, are contained in T I i (resp., y ∈ F I i ).
Proof.
Assume that x i ∈ (A i T i ) I and {x i , x i+1 , . . . , x n } ⊆ T I i . This means that x i = x n and for some i < j ≤ n, x j−1 ∈ (A j−1 T i ) I and x j ∈ (A j−1 F i ) I . Then, by axiom (104), x j−1 ∈ E j i and since I must be minimal w.r.t. axiom (100) the entire domain ∆ I satisfies ∃bad .E j i . However, by axiom (103), this means that A 0 ∃good is unsatisfiable against the hypothesis. 2
Theorem 7.22 Concept satisfiability, subsumption checking, and instance checking are PSPACEhard in Circ fix (aLL EL ⊥ ). The result still holds if the nesting level of existential restrictions is bounded by a constant, and the priority relation is empty.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem it suffices to show that the QBF ψ is true iff A 0 ∃good is satisfiable w.r.t. the above KB.
[if ] Let I be a model of Circ fix (KB) that satisfies A 0 ∃good . Due to axioms (96)- (98), I must contain a DAG that starts with x (which is in (A 0 ∃good ) I ) and, following the R-edges, proceeds through the concepts A i of increasing index, up to A n . In this DAG, for all i = 1 . . . n such that Q i = ∀, individuals belonging to a A I i have two successors: one in A I i+1 ∩ T I i+1 and the other in A I i+1 ∩ F I i+1 . Individuals in A I i , where Q i = ∃, have only one successor, in A I i+1 . Due to Lemma 7.20, such a successor is either in T I i+1 or F I i+1 . Now, consider any truth assignment v to the universally quantified variables of ψ. In the DAG, follow the unique path from x to a leaf z ∈ A I n , that for each level i corresponding to a Q i = ∀ proceeds with A I i+1 ∩ T I i+1 or A I i+1 ∩ F I i+1 in accordance with v. By Lemma 7.20, for all i = 1 . . . n z is in either T i or F i , moreover, by Lemma 7.21, membership of z in T i or F i is consistent with v. Therefore, z represents a full truth assignment of the variables in ψ which extends v. Now, since I minimizes the set of abnormal individuals w.r.t. the defeasible inclusion (99) and in all models ∃good and ∃bad are disjoint, x ∈ ∃good I implies that z ∈ B Ī ϕ . But then, it is straightforward to conclude that this truth assignment satisfies ϕ.
[only if ]. Assume that ψ is true. Assume w.l.o.g. that odd quantifiers Q 1 , Q 3 , . . . , Q n−1 are universal and even quantifiers are existential. For each existential quantifier Q i , let f i : {T, F } i/2 → {T, F } be the function such that for all values v 1 , v 3 , . . . , v n−1 of the universally quantified variables, ϕ(v 1 , f 2 (v 1 ), v 3 , f 4 (v 1 , v 3 ), . . . , f n (v 1 , v 3 , . . . , v n−1 )) is true.
We define a tree-like model I of KB that satisfies A 0 ∃good . We start with a root individual x, such that x |= I A 0 ∃good . We proceed inductively as follows. For even i (including 0), each individual y ∈ A I i has two R-successors y , y ∈ A I i+1 , such that y ∈ T I i and y ∈ F I i (see axioms (97)). For odd i, each individual y ∈ A I i has one R-successor y ∈ A I i+1 (see axioms (98)), such that y satisfies either T i or F i , according to the value of f i when applied to the truth values that can be read along the path from the root to y. Along each R − path x 0 . . . x i . . . x n the same concept T i or F i assigned to x i is assigned to all x j , with i < j ≤ n, and indifferently either T i or F i is assigned to the x h with 1 ≤ h ≤ i. The model is completed by assigning to x n (i) B F ∧G , for all subformulas F ∧ G ofφ, such that F and G are assigned to x n , and (ii) B F ∨G , for all subformulas F ∨ G ofφ, such that F or G are assigned to x n .
We leave to the reader the proof that the structure just defined satisfies the classical part of KB. Regarding minimality w.r.t. the defeasible inclusions in KB, we remark the following. All the individuals violate inclusions (99). However, due to rules (94) and (95), the situation cannot be improved by simply modifying the roles. Similarly, all the individuals violate inclusions (100)-(101). However, since the E j i are all empty these defeasible inclusions cannot be improved. Finally, since each leaf z ∈ A n represents a truth assignment that satisfies φ, then Bφ is empty and hence our model is also minimal w.r.t. the inclusion (102).
The LL fragment of EL ⊥ , unlike LL f , does not fully support unqualified existential. Consequently, Theorem 4.4 cannot by used to transfer the hardness results of Theorem 7.19 from var to fix. 9 The above hardness results hold only for the more general framework Circ var (LL f EL ⊥ ) and hence, by Theorem 4.4,for Circ fix (LL f EL ⊥ ):
Proposition 7.23 Subsumption and instance checking over Circ fix (LL f EL ⊥ ) are Π p 2 -hard; concept satisfiability is Σ p 2 -hard. These results hold even if queries contain only LL EL ⊥ concepts, and priorities are specificity-based.
The following result, whose proof can be found in the Appendix, shows a context in which the above lower bounds are tight: namely, the case in which the priority relation is empty (i.e., DIs are mutually incomparable) and, for subsumption queries C D or instance checking queries D(a), the quantifier depth of D is bounded by a constant.
⊥ knowledge base, and C, D be EL ⊥ concepts. For all models I ∈ Circ fix (KB) and for all x ∈ C I \ D I there exists a model J ∈ Circ fix (KB) such
Going back to the LL fragment, in the following we prove that Circ fix is less complex than Circ var (unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses). In particular, we show that Circ fix (LLEL ⊥ ) is tractable. Algorithm 1 takes as input a knowledge base KB and two concepts C and D (we may assume without loss of generality that C = A C n i=1 ∃P i .B i ) and checks whether Circ fix (KB) |= C D.
9. We will prove below that in LL EL ⊥ , Circ fix is actually less complex than Circvar.
if SupCls(∃P.B) ⊆ SupCls(C) and NonEmpty(∃P.B, K S ) ⊆ NonEmpty(C, K S ) then X := X ∃P.B;
With SupCls(H) we mean the set of superclasses of a concept H, i.e., the set of B ∈ N C ∪ {⊥} such that H K S B. Given a concept H, the operator NonEmpty(H, K S ) represents the set of concepts that are forced to be non empty whenever H is. Note that this set includes some concepts that are forced to be non empty by the ABox in KB, independently from H. We write H ; A iff H K S ∃R.A for some R, and we denote by + ; the transitive closure of ;. Then, NonEmpty(H, K S ) is formally defined as follows:
Roughly speaking, the algorithm accumulates the RHS of defeasible inclusions actively satisfied by a witness of C. Then, it tries to derive D. In particular, a defeasible inclusion A n ∃R.B is actively satisfied just in the case (i) does not entail locally ⊥ or a concept name not subsumed by C, and (ii) does not entail globally the non-emptiness of a concept name that should be empty. The rationale is that concept names are fixed and circumscription cannot change their extension as the application of A n ∃R.B could instead require.
Lemma 7.25 Circ fix (KB) |= C D holds iff Algorithm 1 returns true.
[if ] It suffices to show that for all models of Circ fix (KB), X subsumes C, where X is the formula obtained after the while statement. Assume per absurdum that for some model I and an individual x ∈ ∆ I , x ∈ C I \ X I . This means that for some defeasible inclusion A ⊆ n ∃P.B (i) x ∈ sat I (A ⊆ n ∃P.B) and (ii) from line 1, SupCls(∃P.B) ⊆ SupCls(C) and NonEmpty(∃P.B,
Note that, since NonEmpty(∃P.B, K S ) ⊆ NonEmpty(C, K S ), whenever ∃R.B K S ∃S.B there exists an individual yB ∈B I . Let I be the interpretation obtained from I by adding all such (x, yB). Clearly, by adding new arcs the set of individuals that satisfied a defeasible inclusion δ cannot decrease, therefore for all δ ∈ K D , sat I (δ) ⊆ sat I (δ). Moreover, since x ∈ (∃R.B) I , sat I (A ⊆ n ∃P.B) ⊂ sat I (A ⊆ n ∃P.B) and hence I < fix I.
From condition (ii) and the fact that defeasible inclusions do not conflict with each other, it is easy to verify that I is also a classical model of KB, but this would mean that I is not a model of Circ fix (KB) against the hypothesis.
[only if ] Assume that Algorithm 1 returns false. Let I be the following interpretation:
• for all B ∈ N C , B I is the union of: (i) {x C } if B ∈ S 1 , (ii) the set of x A , with A ∈ S 2 , such that A |= K S B, and (iii) the set of x a , with a ∈ N I , such that K S |= B(a);
• for all R ∈ N R , R I is the union of the pairs (i) (x A , x B ) where A, B ∈ S 2 and A K S ∃R.B, (ii) (x a , x b ) where a, b ∈ N I and K S |= R(a, b), (iii) (x a , x B ) where a ∈ N I , B ∈ S 2 and K S |= ∃R.B(a), (iv) (x C , x B ) where B ∈ S 2 and X K S ∃R.B; other arcs are not relevant.
By construction I is a (classical) model of K S and x C ∈ C I \ D I , hence in order to prove I ∈ Circ fix (KB) it remains to show that I is minimal. Note that, since defeasible inclusions do not contain nested roles on the right side, the set of defeasible inclusions satisfied by an individual does not affect the set of defeasible inclusions satisfied by another individual. Therefore, an interpretation can be improved point-wise and we can assume w.l.o.g. that all the individuals in I, except x C , cannot be further improved. Assume now that there exists an interpretation J that improves I in x C , this means in particular that for some δ = A n ∃P.B,
The assumption x C ∈ sat I (δ) means that ∃P.B does not satisfy the condition in line 1 and, since concept names are fixed, δ cannot be satisfied in J . 2
Theorem 7.26 In Circ fix (LL EL ⊥ ) DKBs, LL EL ⊥ subsumption, instance checking, and concept consistency are in P.
Proof. Since SupCls(H) and NonEmpty(H, K S ) are based on classical reasoning, they can be performed in polynomial time. Moreover, the number of iterations in Algorithm 1 is bounded by the number of defeasible inclusions. Therefore, due to Lemma 7.25, the subsumption problem is tractable. By Theorem 3.9, instance checking and concept inconsistency can be reduced to subsumption.
Complexity is low under Circ fix because in this context LL axioms are not general enough to simulate quantifier nesting nor conjunctions of existential restrictions. In Circ var these features can be simulated by abbreviating compound concepts C with concept names A using equivalences A ≡ C such that C does not depend on qualified existentials (hence the LL restriction is preserved). With Circ fix , such equivalences change the semantics of C whenever C is (or contains) an existential restriction, because A is fixed and prevents C from varying freely. As we reintroduce the missing features, complexity increases again. Let LL 2 EL ⊥ support the schemata:
One may easily verify that LL 2 EL ⊥ is equivalent to LL EL ⊥ plus schema ∃P 1 ∃P 2 ∃P 3 .B. The missing axioms can be reformulated using fresh roles R and suitable equivalences ∃R ≡ C (that preserve C's semantics because R is a varying predicate) 10 .
With these additional schemata, one can create conflicts between variable concepts, as in ∃P 1 ∃P 2 ⊥. Then different defeasible inclusions may block each other, thereby creating a potentially exponential search space.
Theorem 7.27 Subsumption and instance checking over Circ fix (LL 2 EL ⊥ ) are coNP-hard; concept satisfiability is NP-hard. These results hold even if the three reasoning tasks are restricted to LL 2 EL ⊥ concepts, and priorities are specificity-based.
10. In particular, schema A1 A2 B can be emulated by the inclusions A1 ∃R1, A2 ∃R2, B ∃R3, ∃R1 A1, ∃R2 A2, ∃R3 B, and ∃R1 ∃R2 ∃R3.
Proof. By reduction of SAT. For each propositional variable p i introduce the concept names A i ,Ā i , and role U i , representing p i 's truth value (resp. true, false, and undefined). These alternatives are made mutually inconsistent with:
For each given clause c j = l j,1 ∨ · · · ∨ l j,n , introduce a concept nameC j representing c j 's falsity, and for eachL j,k representing the complement of l j,k addL j,1 · · · L j,n C j .
Define a concept nameF representing the falsity of the given set of clauses, and a disjoint concept F with:C j F (for all input clauses c j )F F ⊥ . Now, with a defeasible inclusion, ∃U i is forced to be true for all individuals that satisfy neither A i norĀ i ; moreover, a role U detects undefined literals:
Let K be the above set of inclusions and KB = K, ≺ K . It can be proved that the given set of clauses S is unsatisfiable iff Circ fix (KB) |= F ∃U , therefore subsumption checking is coNPhard.
Similarly, it can be proved that S is unsatisfiable iff Circ fix (KB ) |= (∃U )(a), where KB = K , ≺ K and K = K ∪ {F (a)}; therefore instance checking is coNP-hard.
Finally, it can be proved that S is satisfiable iff F ∃OK is satisfiable w.r.t. Circ fix (KB ), where KB = K , ≺ K and K = K ∪ {∃U ∃OK ⊥}; therefore satisfiability checking is NP-hard.
We are only left to remark that K can be easily encoded in LL 2 EL ⊥ . 2
We prove that this bound is tight using Algorithm 2. The algorithm non-deterministically looks for an individual x (in some model) that satisfies C and not D. S 1 guesses any additional fixed concept names satisfied by x; S 2 guesses the concept names that are satisfied somewhere in the model (not necessarily by x) and finally ≺ guesses a total extension of ≺ that determines the application order of GDIs. Similarly to Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 selects the defeasible inclusions that are active in x and accumulates in the formula X the RHS of those that are not blocked, i.e. do not require to change the interpretation of the concept names neither locally nor globally. The major differences are that (i) defeasible inclusions are extracted according to ≺ and (ii) in line 2 the entire accumulated formula X ∃P.B is used to check that a defeasible inclusion is not blocked.
Finally, note that the variable part of C (i.e. n i=1 ∃P i .B i ) is introduced in X only in line 8, after all defeasible inclusions have been applied, because defeasible inclusions can influence the variable part (e.g. by forcing it to be empty).
Lemma 7.28 Circ fix (KB) |= C D holds iff all the runs of Algorithm 2 return true.
Proof.
[if ] Assume per absurdum that there exists an interpretation I ∈ Circ fix (KB) and an individual x ∈ ∆ I such that x ∈ C I \ D I . Let S 1 and S 2 be the set of concept names in N C that I satisfies respectively locally in x and globally -i.e., for some individual. Let ≺ be a linearization of ≺ compatible with I, i.e. for all δ, δ ∈ K D (i) either δ ≺ δ or δ ≺ δ, (ii) δ ≺ δ implies δ ≺ δ , (iii) if δ and δ are not comparable according to ≺ (δ ≺ δ and δ ≺ δ) and x ∈ sat I (δ) \ sat I (δ ), then δ ≺ δ . . To the best of our knowledge, that was the first effective reasoning method for a nonmonotonic description logic.
A hybrid of Circ fix (EL ⊥ ) and closed world assumption has been proved to be in PTIME (Bonatti et al., 2010) . On the one hand, that approach imposes less restrictions on the structure of inclusions; on the other hand, it cannot be fully extended to variable predicates without affecting tractability.
A recent approach that is similar in spirit to circumscription has been taken by Giordano et al. (2008) . They extend ALC with a modal operator T representing typicality, and maximize T 's extension to achieve nonmonotonic inferences. Decidability is proved via a tableau algorithm that also establishes a co-NExpTime NP upper bound for subsumption. No matching lower bounds are given; it is proved that reasoning in the underlying monotonic logic is NP-hard.
Finally, an approach based on rational closures and ALC can be found in the work of Casini and Straccia (2010) . An appealing feature of this approach is that reasoning can be reduced to classical inference. Complexity is not increased by nonmonotonic reasoning: it ranges from PSPACE to ExpTime.
Discussion and Future Work
The main complexity results of this paper are summarized in Table 1 . By restricting circumscribed KBs to Circ var (DL-lite R ), complexity decreases significantly (from (co)-NExpTime NP to the second level of PH). The same complexity upper bounds hold in Circ fix (DL-lite R ) whenever the priority relation is empty or the defeasible inclusions admit only concept names on the LHS. However, the general case is still an open question.
On the contrary, restricting the language to EL or EL ⊥ does not in general suffice to bring complexity within PH. In particular, it can be proved that reasoning tasks are undecidable in Circ * F (EL) (i.e., when roles can be fixed) and that reasoning in Circ fix (EL) and Circ var (EL ⊥ ) is in general ExpTime-hard.
The main source of the higher complexity of the EL family (w.r.t. DL-lite R ) has been identified by introducing a further restriction called full left locality (LL f ) that suffices to confine complexity within the second level of PH under Circ var with specificity-based priorities, provided that the quantifier nesting level in subsumption queries and instance checking queries is suitably bounded (no restrictions are needed on concept satisfiability).
Since the left locality restriction rules out acyclic terminologies (which are commonly used in ontologies), it has been relaxed to almost left local (aLL) knowledge bases, that support acyclic terminologies with the restriction that unfolding (i.e., the process of replacing the atoms defined in the acyclic terminology with their definition) should yield a LL f knowledge base. Reasoning becomes PSPACE-hard, in general; however in the aLL fragment of Circ var (and under the same assumptions needed for LL f ), reasoning remains complete for the second level of PH. In particular, the assumption that the priorities are determined by specificity is essential: By Theorem 4.5, general priorities make Circ var at least as complex as Circ fix , that is, PSPACE-hard.
We have also analyzed the complexity of several fragments lying between LL and aLL under Circ fix . These results provide some further information about the complexity sources in circumscribed DLs. For example, quantifier nesting in the KB is partially responsible for complexity (presumably because it enables conflicts between the default properties of different individuals): in particular, by removing quantifier nesting (i.e., by restricting KBs to the LL 2 fragment) complexity drops to the first level of PH. The other source of complexity, of course, is due to the conflicts between defeasible inclusions concerning each individual in isolation; in Circ fix (LLEL ⊥ ) a defeasible inclusion can never block another inclusion (because fixed predicates prevent this) and-as a consequence-complexity drops within PTIME.
We have also proved that in all fragments that fully support unqualified existential restrictions, variable concept names can be eliminated. Moreover, in EL ⊥ and its various left local fragments, compound concepts can be replaced with concept names in the left-hand side of defeasible inclusions, without affecting expressiveness. In the same fragments, general priorities can be simulated using only specificity-based priorities.
We have to leave several interesting questions open: First, it is not clear whether general priorities are necessary to the hardness results for DL-lite R ; in particular, it would be interesting to establish the exact complexity of DL-lite R with specificity-based priorities. Other gaps in the complexity of circumscribed DL-lite R concern the complexity of Circ fix with unrestricted GDIs or nonempty priority relations, and the complexity of reasoning with fixed roles. The next interesting question is whether the bound on quantifier nesting in the queries is actually needed to confine complexity of circumscribed EL ⊥ within the second level of PH. Finally, there is no exact charcterization of the complexity of Circ fix (LL f EL ⊥ ) and of the fragments whose complexity lies beyond PH.
For the fragments that do belong to the second level of PH, we see an interesting opportunity of encoding reasoning in ASP and use some well-engineered engine such as DLV (Eiter, Leone, Mateis, Pfeifer, & Scarcello, 1997) to test scalability. In order to evaluate implementations experimentally, it is necessary to set up suitable benchmarks that, in a first stage, must necessarily be synthetic problems, since nonmonotonic KBs have not been supported so far. Of course, identifying meaningful criteria for problem generation is a nontrivial issue. Therefore, systematic experimental evaluations still require a significant body of work.
hence J |= c j . Thus, J is a model of S. Finally, as said before, if J < var I, then the intersection of i P I i and False I is strictly contained in the intersection of i P J i and False J . This implies that J ⊂ I, against the hypothesis that I is a minimal model.
[if ] Assume that I = model (S, I, ∆) is a model of Circ var (KB S ). First we show that I is a model of S, i.e., for all c j ∈ S, I |= c j . As I satisfies axioms (26-29), for some 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n it holds d i ∈ C I j ∩ True I . Due to IV and V, d i belongs to some L I i such that the corresponding literal l i occurs in c j . According to VI, this implies that I |= l i , and hence I |= c j .
It remains to show that I is a minimal model. Assume that there exists a model J of S such that J ⊂ I, without loss of generality we can assume that J is minimal model. Let J = model (S, J, ∆), from the above arguments J is a model of KB S . Furthermore, sat J (δ) = sat I (δ) for each δ of type L i n ¬L i or C j n ¬C j . Finally, as True J and False J reflect the truth values of J,
∩ F alse J and hence J < var I due to the improvement of DIs (40). 2 Lemma 6.4. If I is a model of Circ var (KB S ), then there exist a minimal model I of S such that p i ∈ I iff P I i ⊆ True I iffP I i ⊆ False I , for all i = 1, . . . , n. Proof. Let I be a model of Circ var (KB S ). First, we show that L I i is a singleton, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n. Assume the contrary. Clearly, to satisfy (18-21), each L I i has to be nonempty. Therefore, for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n, L I k contains at least two individuals. We will show that there exists an interpretation I that improves I.
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, let d i be an arbitrary element of L I i , and let ∆ = {d 1 , . . . , d 2n } ∪ {a I }. As the L I i are disjoint with each other (see axioms (22)) and NonEmpty I is disjoint with any L I i , we have |∆| = 2n + 1.
All PDLP are satisfiable, thus there exists a modelÎ of S. Let I = model (S,Î, ∆). Let I be an interpretation such that: (i) ∆ I = ∆ I , (ii) for all roles R, R I = ∆ I × ∆ I , (iii) I coincides with I on ∆ with respect to all concept names, and (iv) all the other individuals d ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ do not belong to any concept name. It is straightforward to see that I satisfies the classical part of KB S . Furthermore, by construction, (a) for all
Thus, I < var I, due to the improvement of DI (23). By the above argument, we have L I i = {d i }. Define the truth valuation I = {p i | d i ∈ True I }. It remains to prove that I is a minimal model of S. The fact that I is a model of S is ensured by axioms (24-29). Then, assume by contradiction that there exists a model J of S that is smaller than I (i.e., J ⊂ I), and let J = model (S, J, ∆). From J we can build an interpretation J with ∆ J = ∆ I and such that J is a classical model of KB S and J < var I, thus contradicting the hypothesis that I is a model of Circ var (KB S ). We define J by copying from J all the properties (concepts and roles) of the individuals in ∆ J = ∆, and by leaving all the individuals in ∆ I \ ∆ out of concept and role extensions. 2
A.2 Proofs for Section 7
Given a KB K, an interpretation I, and an individual z, recall the definition of KB [z] from Section 6.2. Redefine the notion of "support" as follows: supp I (C) is the set of individuals z ∈ ∆ I such that KB [z] C holds. Lemma 7.12. Let KB = K, ≺ K be an LL f EL ⊥ knowledge base, and C, D be EL ⊥ concepts. For all models I ∈ Circ var (KB) and for all x ∈ C I \ D I there exists a model J ∈ Circ var (KB) such
Proof. Given two individuals x and y in ∆ I , the distance d(x, y) is the minimal length of role-paths from x to y. Let KB * be the knowledge base obtained from KB by applying the transformation presented in Section 7. Notice that |KB * | ≤ |KB| 2 . By Lemma 7.10, I can be extended into a model of Circ var (KB * ), which we continue to call I for convenience. We define a small model J of Circ var (KB * ) such that x ∈ C J \ D J . Then, we obtain the thesis by Lemma 7.11.
We start from an initial domain ∆ J that contains (i) x; (ii) all a I , where a ∈ N I occurs in KB * ; (iii) for all concepts H ∈ cl(KB * ) ∪ cl(C) such that H I = ∅, a witness y H ∈ H I ; (iv) for all concepts H ∈ cl(KB * ) ∪ cl(C) such that supp I (H) = ∅, a witness w H ∈ supp I (H). We expand J by exhaustively applying the following rule (where ∃P is a special case of ∃P.H with H = ):
Let y ∈ ∆ J and ∃P.H ∈ cl(KB * ) ∪ cl(C) be such that y ∈ (∃P.H) I and y ∈ (∃P.H) J . If d(x, y) < d, then add z to ∆ J and (y, z) to P J , where z is such that (y, z) ∈ P I and z ∈ H I . Otherwise, add (y, y H ) to P J . By construction for each individual y ∈ ∆ J and H ∈ cl(KB * )∪cl(C) if y ∈ H I , then y ∈ H J . In particular, in case H = ∃P , also the inverse holds, if y ∈ ∃P J , then y ∈ ∃P I . From the previous two facts it immediately follows that J is a classical model of KB * and x ∈ C J . Moreover, since up to a distance d from x, P J is contained in P I , for all P ∈ N R , it is easy to see that x ∈ D J .
It remains to show that J is minimal. Assume by contradiction that for some classical model J of KB * , it holds J < var J , we show that there exists a classical model I of KB * such that I < var I -against the hypothesis that I ∈ Circ var (KB * ). We distinguish two cases: in the first cas, all individuals w H introduced in clause (iv) still satisfy the corresponding concept H in J ; in the second case, at least one w H does not satisfy its concept H. We define I as follows. In both cases, individual names are interpreted as in I and concept names for individuals in ∆ J are interpreted as in J .
In the first case, an individual z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J satisfies a concept name A, that is z ∈ A I , if and only if z ∈ supp I (A). Moreover, for each P ∈ N R , P I is the minimal set such that:
1. P J ⊆ P I ; 2. if z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J and z ∈ supp I (∃P.H), and y ∈ H J then (z, y) ∈ P I .
We prove that I is a classical model of KB * . Since I is a copy of J over ∆ J and J is a classical model, we only need to show that the individuals z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J satisfy all the strong inclusions in K S . Note that if z satisfies in I the LHS H of a strong inclusion, then z supports H in I. By definition, z supports also the RHS in I. If the RHS is a concept name B, then z ∈ B I by construction. Otherwise, i.e., if the RHS is ∃P.H, by step 2 above, it suffices to show that H J is not empty. However, by assumption, the witness of ∃P.H introduced in clause (iv) still satisfies ∃P.H in J . Therefore, there exists an individual y satisfying H in J .
Next, we prove that I < var I. Since J < var J , it suffices to show that an individual z ∈ ∆ I \∆ J satisfies in I all the defeasible inclusions it satisfies in I. Assume that a DI δ = (A n B) is satisfied by z in I. If z ∈ A I , then by construction z ∈ supp I (A). Clearly, if z ∈ supp I (A) and z ∈ sat I (A n B), then z ∈ supp I (B). Therefore, z ∈ B I .
We are left to prove the theorem for the second case, i.e.: at least one w H does not satisfy its concept H. Clearly, w H does not support H in J anymore. In particular, there must be a DI δ such that w H ∈ sat J (δ) \ sat J (δ). From J < var J , it follows that there must be a DI δ such that δ ≺ K δ and sat J (δ ) ⊂ sat J (δ ). Now, in I we can safely violate all DIs whose priority is lower than δ , and in particular all DIs whose LHS classically subsumes . Then, complete the definition of I as follows. Each basic concept A holds in an individual z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J if and only if K S A. For each P ∈ N R , P I is the minimal set such that 1. P J ⊆ P I ; 2. if z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J , K S ∃P.H, and y ∈ H J then (z, y) ∈ P I .
It is easy to verify that I is a classical model of KB * . In order to prove that I < var I, note that the following two facts hold.
First, an individual z ∈ ∆ I \∆ J satisfies all the DIs whose priority is not minimal. Assume that δ 1 ≺ K δ 2 , for some DIs δ 1 and δ 2 , this means that the LHS of δ 2 subsumes the LHS of δ 1 but not the vice versa. Then, the LHS of δ 1 does not subsume and hence, by construction, z vacuously satisfies δ 1 .
Second, if z violates a DI δ = (A n B), then δ ≺ K δ . As before, since δ ≺ K δ, its LHS does not subsume . However, since z violates δ , z ∈ A I and hence A subsumes . Therefore, δ ≺ K δ .
From the first fact it immediately follows that sat I (δ ) ⊂ sat I (δ ). Assume now, that for some δ , sat I (δ ) ⊆ sat I (δ ). If there exists an individual z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J such that z ∈ sat I (δ ) \ sat I (δ ), then by the second fact δ ≺ K δ . Otherwise, there must exist an individual w ∈ ∆ J such that w ∈ sat I (δ ) \ sat I (δ ). However, in ∆ J the set of DIs that an individual satisfies in I (resp. I ) is the same set of DIs it satisfies in J (resp. J ). This means that there exists a defeasible inclusion δ such that δ ≺ K δ and sat J (δ ) ⊂ sat J (δ ). Due to the first fact, δ is satisfied in all ∆ I \ ∆ J , and hence sat I (δ ) ⊂ sat I (δ ). 2 Proposition 7.13. Let KB = K LL ∪ K a , ≺ be an aLL EL ⊥ knowledge base. Every model of Circ F (unf(KB)) can be extended to a model of Circ F (KB).
Proof. Let K unf = unf(KB) = K , ≺ . Let I be any model of Circ F (K unf ). Extend it to a classical model J of K ∪ K a by setting A J = D J for all definitions A ≡ D in K a . Note that K ∪ K a is classically equivalent to K LL ∪ K a . Now suppose that J is not a model of Circ F (KB). Since by construction J is a classical model of K a and the strong axioms of K LL , there must be a classical model J of the same axioms such that J < F J . By restricting J to primitive predicates (i.e., predicates that are not defined in K a ), we obtain a classical model I of K . Note that for all defeasible inclusions δ ∈ K LL , it holds sat J (δ) = sat J (unf(δ, K a )) = sat I (unf(δ, K a )) and sat J (δ) = sat J (unf(δ, K a )) = sat I (unf(δ, K a )). It follows that I < F I, a contradiction. 2
Proposition 7.14. Let KB = K LL ∪ K a , ≺ be an aLL EL ⊥ knowledge base and suppose that all the concept names defined in K a are variable. Then, for all models I of Circ F (KB), the restriction of I to primitive predicates is a model of Circ F (unf(KB)).
Proof. Let K unf = unf(KB) = K , ≺ . Let J be the restriction of I to primitive predicates. In other words, J is obtained from I by dropping the interpretation of all concept names defined in K a , which are all variable. It can be easily verified that J is a classical model of K . Suppose by contradiction that J is not a model of Circ F (K unf ); then there exists a classical model J of K such that J < F J . Now extend J to a model I of K LL ∪ K a by setting A I = D I for all definitions A ≡ D in K a . Since the predicates defined in K a are variable, all fixed predicates preserve their extensions across I, J , J , and I . Moreover, for all defeasible inclusions δ ∈ K LL , we have sat I (δ) = sat I (unf(δ, K a )) = sat J (unf(δ, K a )) and sat I (δ) = sat I (unf(δ, K a )) = sat J (unf(δ, K a )). It follows that I < F I, a contradiction.
Given a knowledge base KB, an interpretation I and a concept D, again we have to override the notion of support; supp I (D) is the set of z ∈ ∆ I such that
Clearly, if I is a classical model of KB and z ∈ supp I (D), then z ∈ D I .
Lemma 7.24. Let KB = K S ∪K D , ∅ be an LL f EL ⊥ knowledge base, and C, D be EL ⊥ concepts. For all models I ∈ Circ fix (KB) and for all x ∈ C I \ D I there exists a model J ∈ Circ fix (KB) such that (i)
Proof. Define the "small" model J as in the proof of Lemma 7.12, using the new definition of support. Regarding the size of J and the fact that it is a classical model of KB, the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 7.12 apply. In particular, it holds |∆ J | = O((|KB| + |C|) d ).
It remains to show that J is < fix -minimal. Assume by contradiction that for some interpretation J , it holds J < fix J ; as usual, we show that there exists I , such that I < fix I. Let I be defined as follows: ∆ I = ∆ I ; a I = a I , for all a ∈ N I ; A I = A I , for all A ∈ N C ; P I is the minimal set such that:
• P J ⊆ P I , and
• for all z ∈ ∆ I \ ∆ J , for all y ∈ ∆ J and for all ∃P.H ∈ cl(KB) such that z ∈ supp I (∃P.H), if y ∈ H I , then (z, y) ∈ P I (∃P can be seen as a special case where H = ).
First, we prove that I is a classical model of KB. In particular, it suffices to show that classical inclusions are satisfied in ∆ I \ ∆ J . Given a classical inclusion C 1 D 1 of KB, assume that z ∈ C I 1 , and recall that C 1 is of the type A 1 . . . A n ∃R 1 . . . ∃R m .
It suffices to show that there exists an individual w ∈ ∆ J that satisfies C 1 as well. By construction, for all ∃R occurring in C 1 , z ∈ supp I (∃R), therefore z ∈ supp I (C 1 ). This means that there exists a witness w ∈ supp I (C 1 ) in ∆ J . Since for each concept E, w ∈ E I implies w ∈ E J , it follows that w ∈ supp J (C 1 ). Since the priority relation is empty, for each DI δ in K D it holds sat J (δ) ⊆ sat J (δ). As a consequence, for each concept E it holds supp J (E) ⊆ supp J (E). In Zhang, R., Artale, A., Giunchiglia, F., & Crispo, B. (2009 
